At 21, Mr. Packingham was convicted of taking indecent liberties with a minor—a non-contact offense in North Carolina. As a result he was placed on North Carolina’s sex offender registry and subjected to the state’s prohibition against having or accessing an account on any online platform that allowed exchange of ideas and on which minors were allowed to create and maintain accounts.

In 2010, Packingham violated this law when he took to Facebook to claim, “God is good,” over having a traffic ticket dismissed. As a result he was arrested and charged, not for what he said but for where he said it. He and his attorneys have fought the charges for the past six years, a fight that culminated in arguments before the U.S. Supreme Court.

At the heart of the argument is the First Amendment right to free speech. Packingham has satisfied all court-imposed requirements and has successfully completed his criminal sentence. He is under no state or federal supervision. He has not re-offended or come under scrutiny for any illegal activity except using Facebook to express his joy about the outcome of a traffic ticket.

The National Association for Rational Sexual Offense Laws (NARSOL) and North Carolina RSOL supported Packingham’s First Amendment claims by way of an amicus brief filed on his behalf. We contend, as do Mr. Packingham and his attorneys, that depriving over 17,000 North Carolina citizens of social media access just because they are on the sex offender registry is an egregious abuse of the state’s power and does virtually nothing to address the state’s compelling interest in protecting minors.

The ban applies to all registrants regardless of whether or not their original offenses involved a minor, whether or not those offenses involved Internet use, or whether the persons were engaging in “stalking” or “grooming” behavior towards a minor. Such a ban makes illegal perfectly innocent and legal activities such as participating in or even following political discussions on Twitter, advertising one’s home business on Facebook, or commenting on a variety of opinion pieces on almost all online media comment platforms.

If the state of North Carolina is convinced that its youth are at risk from citizens on the registry due to contact through online activities, a ban on such activities can surely be tailored more narrowly to address real criminal conduct rather than cutting such a wide swath through the heart of the First Amendment.

…………………………………………………………………………………………………

Here’s how other media outlets are covering oral arguments:
ScotusBlog
U.S. News & World Report
Bloomberg

Writing for the majority, Justice Robert H. “Bob” Edmunds reasoned that since the statute under review in Packingham concerned only conduct, and not speech, the impact to registered citizens’ First Amendment rights was merely incidental to the otherwise legitimate interest of the state in prohibiting such conduct. He further reasoned that there were already “ample alternative means” through which registered citizens could participate in expressive forums open and available to them. His reasoning was strained and tortured and his opinion was summarily dismembered by the dissent penned by Justice Robin E. Hudson.

For additional information and analyses of what’s at stake for the community of registered citizens throughout the entire nation, please read Eugene Volokh’s piece in the Washington Post. Prof. Volokh teaches free speech law, religious freedom law, church-state relations law, a First Amendment Amicus Brief Clinic, and tort law, at UCLA School of Law and filed an Amicus Brief in support of the petition for Certiorari in the Packingham case.

Molnar and her allies have considered lobbying the Legislature to ban these ordinances, but they’ve found lawmakers unreceptive in the past to any bill perceived to benefit sex offenders. So she decided to go to court.

Molnar enlisted a small army of parents and siblings of sex offenders to compile a list of towns with such ordinances, and assembled research showing that the rules can actually make the public less safe. She enlisted Denton lawyer Richard Gladden. He was already representing Taylor Rice, who as a 20 year-old had sex with a 14 year-old he met online and now, after his conviction for sexual assault, was legally barred from living with his parents because their house was too close to a high school’s baseball field. Gladden had found a 2007 opinion by then-attorney general (now governor) Greg Abbott saying that towns with fewer than 5,000 residents — which fall into a particular legal category in Texas — are not authorized by the state to enact such restrictions on their own.

Gladden sent letters threatening lawsuits to 46 city councils. Within two months, half of them had repealed their ordinances. Gladden and Molnar are currently suing 11 of the remaining towns.

Restrictions on where registered sex offenders can work, live, and visit vary widely from state to state and city to city. Over the last few years, Molnar and her counterparts in other states have come to the same conclusion: Politicians aren’t going to help them. “Who wants to risk being called a pedophile-lover?” says Robin van der Wall, a North Carolina registrant on the board of the national group Reform Sex Offender Laws.

So the activists have taken the route favored by other politically unpopular groups and turned to the legal system, where they are more likely to encounter judges insulated from electoral concerns. Their legal claims vary, but in numerous cases, reformers have argued that these restrictions associated with registration add up to a sort of second sentence, and that they are defined in a vague way that makes them difficult to abide by. In some cases, the plaintiffs have argued that individual towns have enacted restrictions above and beyond what states allow them to impose. (Please continue reading at The Marshall Project)

This article was published in collaboration with The Texas Observer.

The new law bans offenders whose victims were under 18, or anyone legally deemed a threat to children, from many places kids may gather. It replaces a previous law a judge deemed too vague in 2009.

Haywood County leaders say the new law lays out specific places sex offenders can’t go.

“It would prevent people who are registered sex offenders from going into libraries, from going to schools, from going to the fairgrounds when the fair is on,” County Manager Ira Dove said.

“I think it’s good. They need to stay away,” parent Amber Williams said.

“I think once you’ve committed a crime against children, there’s no going back,” parent Heather Russell said.
The law is named after Jessica Lunsford, a 9-year-old girl from Gastonia, who was killed by a sex offender after she moved to Florida in 2005.

The new law also bars sex offenders from going within 300 feet of places like shopping centers or other public places used mainly for the care or supervision of minors.

Not everyone thinks the law is fair. The North Carolina president of “Reform Sex Offender Laws” said it’s overly restrictive, narrowly interprets “sex offender,” and calls the restrictions “unconstitutional deprivations of liberty.”

“There must be some scrutiny, some level of scrutiny that protects people who are no longer under any court order, who are no longer serving any kind of time,” Robin Vanderwall, President of the North Carolina chapter of Reform Sex Offender Laws, said.
“I understand it in that perspective. But, I still don’t think…I mean…doing better or not…they still did what they did,” Russell said.

Opponents of the law plan to fight it.

“Our essential hope, legally speaking, is to finally put the state up against the wall when it comes to the presumption of dangerousness,” Vanderwall said.

Parents remain resolved.

“No kid needs to be around that. It’s awful. It is,” Williams said.

Please see full news video on WLOS News ABC 13

Judge Alice M. Batchelder wrote for the court, joined by Judges Gilbert S. Merritt and Bernice B. Donald. Her opinion for the court begins.

Like many states, Michigan has amended its Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) on a number of occasions in recent years for the professed purpose of making Michigan communities safer and aiding law enforcement in the task of bringing recidivists to justice. Thus, what began in 1994 as a non-public registry maintained solely for law enforcement use . . . has grown into a byzantine code governing in minute detail the lives of the state’s sex offenders . . . Over the first decade or so of SORA’s existence, most of the changes centered on the role played by the registry itself. In 1999, for example, the legislature added the requirement that sex offenders register in person (either quarterly or annually, depending on the offense) and made the registry available online, providing the public with a list of all registered sex offenders’ names, addresses, biometric data, and, since 2004, photographs. . . . Michigan began taking a more aggressive tack in 2006, however, when it amended SORA to prohibit registrants (with a few exceptions . . .) from living, working, or “loitering”1 within 1,000 feet of a school. . . . In 2011, the legislature added the requirement that registrants be divided into three tiers, which ostensibly correlate to current dangerousness, but which are based, not on individual assessments, but solely on the crime of conviction. . . . The 2011 amendments also require all registrants to appear in person “immediately” to update information such as new vehicles or “internet identifiers” (e.g., a new email account). . . . Violations carry heavy criminal penalties.

The Plaintiffs in this case—identified here only as five “John Does” and one “Mary Doe”—are registered “Tier III” sex offenders currently residing in Michigan. It is undisputed on appeal that SORA’s 2006 and 2011 amendments apply to them retroactively. That law has had a significant impact on each of them that reaches far beyond the stigma of simply being identified as a sex offender on a public registry. As a result of the school zone restrictions, for example, many of the Plaintiffs have had trouble finding a home in which they can legally live or a job where they can legally work. These restrictions have also kept those Plaintiffs who have children (or grandchildren) from watching them participate in school plays or on school sports teams, and they have kept Plaintiffs from visiting public playgrounds with their children for fear of “loitering.” Plaintiffs are also subject to the frequent inconvenience of reporting to law enforcement in person whenever they change residences, change employment, enroll (or unenroll) as a student, change their name, register a new email address or other “internet identifier,” wish to travel for more than seven days, or buy or begin to use a vehicle (or cease to own or use a vehicle).

Read full story in the Washington Post blog Volokh Conspiracy

You may also be interested in the AP story published in The Detroit News

After the chief justice extended the time for filing, Atty. Glenn Gerding, counsel for the petitioner, Lester Gerard Packingham, filed a Petition for Certiorari from the North Carolina Supreme Court on March 21, 2016.

Mr. Packingham is a North Carolina registrant who was convicted by a jury in 2011 for accessing Facebook, a commercial networking website which permits minors as registered users. This was a violation of N.C.G.S. § 14-202.5. Before trial, Packingham sought to have the charges dismissed on grounds that the statute violated his First Amendment rights. In ruling on the motion, the trial judge found the statute to be constitutional as applied to the defendant and declined to address the defendant’s facial challenge for want of jurisdiction. Packingham was sentenced to 6 to 8 months in prison, fully suspended, pursuant to the completion of 12 months of supervised probation. Packingham appealed.

In August, 2013, a three-judge panel of the North Carolina Court of Appeals vacated the lower court’s ruling and concluded that N.C.G.S. § 14- 202.5 was not narrowly tailored, vague, and failed to “target the ‘evil’ it is intended to rectify.” The Court of Appeals also held that the statute violated “the First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech, and [was] unconstitutional on its face and as applied.”

In turn, the NC Attorney General’s office appealed the Court of Appeals’ decision to the North Carolina Supreme Court which, on November 6, 2015, by a 4 to 2 decision, reversed the Court of Appeals’ Order to Vacate and re-instated Mr. Packigham’s conviction. The state supreme court held the statute to be constitutional in all respects since it proscribes only conduct (access to a social networking site) rather than speech and that the impact on an individual registrant’s speech was merely incidental to this prohibition on conduct.

While the Writ for Certiorari has not yet been granted, the United States Supreme Court appears interested enough in hearing the state’s response, which it formally requested on April 28, 2016. The state has until May 31 to respond so it’s impossible to know at this time either how the state will respond or when the Court might reschedule the Petition for conference.

Packingham’s petition summarizes that the chief question before the Court is “whether, under this Court’s First Amendment precedents, a law that makes it a felony for any person on the state’s registry of former sex offenders to ‘access’ a wide array of websites – including Facebook, YouTube, and nytimes.com – that enable communication, expression, and the exchange of information among their users, if the site is ‘know[n]’ to allow minors to have accounts, is permissible, both on its face and as applied to petitioner – who was convicted based on a Facebook ‘post’ in which he celebrated dismissal of a traffic ticket, declaring ‘God is Good!’”

The Petition for Writ surmises that this case requires the Supreme Court’s intervention because 1) the NC Supreme Court’s decision contravenes “first principles” of basic constitutional law because of the ruling’s unconventional application of “conduct regulation” and “heightened scrutiny” analyses, and 2) that the decision is in conflict with numerous lower court opinions.

Just a week before the U.S. Supreme Court requested a response from North Carolina, a group of 16 law professors led by Eugene Volokh filed an Amici Curiae on behalf of the petitioner focusing exclusively on the NC Supreme Court’s tortured application of an “ample alternative channels” standard to the statute at issue.

Retired professor of law, David Post, recently explained the rationale behind the professors’ brief in a post for The Volokh Conspiracy blog of the Washington Post. Professor Post argues that the NC Supreme Court’s analysis is absurd because it rests upon the incredulous proposition that websites such as the Pauline Dean network, wral.com, glassdoor.com, or shutterfly are comparable to social networking giants such as Facebook, Twitter, or LinkedIn, and that prohibiting registrants from accessing such sites is no impediment to their First Amendment rights because such “ample alternatives” exist. Professor Post cites to his colleague’s previous explication of the Amicus brief here.

It is, of course, impossible to know whether the U.S. Supreme Court will grant the Writ. It grants very few. In any given year, the Court entertains nearly 8,000 petitions and grants certiorari in less than one percent (about 80). But the fact that the Packingham case was originally scheduled for conference on May 12 and then removed from the calendar consequent to the Amicus filing, quickly followed by the Court’s official request for a response from the state of North Carolina, at the very least provides surety that the Court is paying significant attention to the important constitutional questions underlying this Petition.

North Carolina bans registered sex offenders from using or accessing any social networking website that allows under-18-year-olds to post. This includes, of course, the vast bulk of the social networking universe – Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, LinkedIn, Reddit, along with many, many other such sites. The ban is not limited to people who are in prison or on probation or parole (whose First Amendment rights are sharply reduced because of that); it applies even to people who have finished serving their sentences, and who possess, at least in principle, the same First Amendment rights as you and I. Nor is the law limited to sex offenders who had committed crimes against minors (though I think that too would be unconstitutional). Rather, the law makes it a crime for any registered sex offender to either post to such a site or even read it, on the theory that the law is needed “to prevent registered sex offenders from prowling on social media and gathering information about potential child targets.”

There are, as Volokh succinctly put it in the earlier posting, “many First Amendment problems” with the N.C. court’s decision rejecting a challenge to the constitutionality of this prohibition.[**] The amicus brief, though, focused on only one of them: the court’s holding that the prohibition is a “reasonable” restriction on speech because it leaves “ample alternative channels” for the speech of persons covered by the ban. Maybe you can’t post (or even access any posts) on Facebook or Twitter or Instagram or Reddit [or NYTimes.com or the Volokh Conspiracy, for that matter, all of whom allow persons under the age of 18 to post/access) … but “the Web offers numerous alternatives that provide the same or similar services that defendant could access without violating” the statute.

It seems crazy to me — imagine trying to run for public office, or participate in someone else’s campaign for public office, or complain to your City Councilperson, or start a petition drive to get a new streetlight on your corner … without being able to access any of the major social networking sites. Not impossible, sure — but it seems quite far-fetched to suggest that there are “ample alternatives” out there on the Web for you to accomplish these tasks.

Fortunately, we have Supreme Court precedent on our side: City of Ladue v. Gilleo (1994), which invalidated a city ordinance banning homeowners from displaying signs on their property. The city argued that the ordinance left people “free to convey their desired messages by other means, such as hand-held signs, ‘letters, handbills, flyers, telephone calls, newspaper advertisements, bumper stickers, speeches, and neighborhood or community meetings.’” But these alternatives, the court held, were inadequate because they tended to convey a substantively different message, were not as cost-effective or failed to reach the speaker’s intended audience. (Please read David’s full post at Volokh Conspiracy of the Washington Post)

That’s the question of David Feige’s startling new documentary “Untouchable,” a Tribeca Film Festival award winner.

I must note here that I am not completely objective about this film. I have known Feige for many years and was briefly a collaborator with him on a TV pilot project. At the same time I watched the movie with certain prejudices and experiences which made me instinctively hostile and resistant to its message.

Feige’s subject is America’s present set of policies with respect to convicted sex offenders. But, while the film is broadly arguing for a wholesale reassessment of these mechanisms of control, the director has great sympathy for the families of those victimized by sex offenders and for their desire for retribution.

In fact, that’s where his story starts: with powerful Florida lobbyist Ron Book and his daughter Lauren and their account of how she was molested and tortured by an immigrant housekeeper. Then Feige travels around Tampa with Judy Cornett, a working class mother whose son was kidnapped and raped by a local pedophile. Cornett has organized a patrol that seeks to protect neighborhood kids. Feige is an avuncular personality, and he wins his subjects’ trust and his remarkable interviews offer us a deeply affecting view of their heartbreak. (See full article in Forbes Online)

Frustrated by the state’s refusal to offer any facts supporting its “conjectural” and “anecdotal” evidence defending section a(2) of North Carolina’s premises statute (N.C.G.S. § 14-208.18), Senior District Court Judge Beatty ruled on April 22, 2016 that the Does v. Cooper case filed two years ago in the Middle District (federal) Court is resolved without a trial. Having previously struck section a(3) as constitutionally vague, Judge Beatty found a(2) overbroad in burdening the First Amendment rights of registered citizens. Judge Beatty also permanently enjoined the state from prosecuting either under section a(2) or a(3). Judge Beatty had previously ruled section a(1) constitutionally sound (this portion of the statute bans registrants from being “on the premises of any place intended primarily for the use, care, or supervision of minors, including, but not limited to, schools, children’s museums, child care centers, nurseries, and playgrounds.”).

I found it interesting that Judge Beatty cites the dissent in the recent Packingham case decided by the NC Supreme Court in November (which is presently before the US Supreme Court pending cert). That case had nothing to do with proximity or presence, but Judge Beatty cites to language contained therein regarding the impact of internet restrictions on the First Amendment rights of affected citizens. Indeed, he spends a fair amount of time throughout his Memorandum Opinion and Order rooting his Judgment in cases related more to internet restrictions than presence or proximity restrictions. Judge Beatty makes repeated mention of his surprise at the state’s refusal to provide factually based statistics regarding recidivism. And he signals fairly strongly that he finds the Packingham majority completely out of touch.

I have included some excerpts from the opinion below for those of you who don’t have the time to read the full opinion:

Sex offenders have First Amendment rights. (Id. at 43.) The restrictions in subsection (a)(2) greatly burden those First Amendment rights by inhibiting the ability of restricted sex offenders to go to a wide variety of places associated with First Amendment activity.

North Carolina “may pass valid laws to protect children from abuse, and it has. The prospect of crime, however, by itself does not justify laws suppressing protected speech.” Cf. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 245, 122 S. Ct. 1389, 1399, 152 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2002) (internal citations omitted).

Subsection (a)(2) places restrictions on offenders who have never committed a sexual crime against a minor. Moreover, no finding of dangerousness is required for a restricted sex offender to be subjected to subsection (a)(2)’s prohibitions. Merely committing one of the crimes listed in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-208.18(c) subjects the individual to the panoply of First Amendment burdens entailed by subsection (a)(2). The mere fact of a conviction of one of the crimes listed in the statute, by itself, is not enough to establish dangerousness to minors.

To use an expression utilized by the District of Nebraska, North Carolina, in this instance, has used a blunderbuss rather than a scalpel in its effort to protect children.

… In fact, Defendants have made no evidentiary showing at all regarding the rate at which sex offenders recidivate.

. . .Defendants’ decision to not provide expert testimony or statistical reports to the Court was somewhat unexpected. Defendants stated at the status conference that it would not be difficult for them to find an expert to support their case. Yet, Defendants chose not to seek out an expert even after repeated inquiries from the Court regarding whether they desired to do so and after the Court expressly stated that it believed that Defendants’ evidentiary offering was inadequate to carry their burden in this case.

The sweeping order, in a swing state that could play a role in deciding the November presidential election, will enable all felons who have served their prison time and finished parole or probation to register to vote. Most are African-Americans, a core constituency of Democrats, Mr. McAuliffe’s political party.

Amid intensifying national attention over harsh sentencing policies that have disproportionately affected African-Americans, governors and legislatures around the nation have been debating — and often fighting over — moves to restore voting rights for convicted felons.

In Kentucky, Gov. Matt Bevin, a newly elected Republican, recently overturned an order enacted by his Democratic predecessor that was similar to the one Mr. McAuliffe signed Friday. In Maryland, Gov. Larry Hogan, a Republican, vetoed a measure to restore voting rights to convicted felons, but Democrats in the state legislature overrode him in February and an estimated 44,000 former prisoners who are on probation are now eligible to register for voting.

“There’s no question that we’ve had a horrible history in voting rights as relates to African-Americans — we should remedy it,” Mr. McAuliffe said in an interview Thursday, previewing the announcement he made on the steps of Virginia’s Capitol, just yards from where President Abraham Lincoln once addressed freed slaves. “We should do it as soon as we possibly can.”

The action, which Mr. McAuliffe said was justified under an expansive legal interpretation of his executive clemency authority, provoked an immediate backlash from Virginia Republicans. They issued a statement Friday accusing the governor of “political opportunism” and “a transparent effort to win votes.”

“Those who have paid their debts to society should be allowed full participation in society,” said the statement from the party chairman, John Whitbeck. “But there are limits.” He said Mr. McAuliffe was wrong to issue a blanket restoration of rights, even to those who “committed heinous acts of violence.”

There is no way to know how many of the newly eligible voters in Virginia will register. “My message is going to be that I have now done my part,” Mr. McAuliffe said.

Friday’s shift in Virginia is part of a national trend toward restoring voter rights to felons, based in part on the hope that it will aid former prisoners’ re-entry into society. Over the last two decades about 20 states have acted to ease their restrictions, according to the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University.

Only two states — Maine and Vermont — have no voting restrictions on felons. On the other side, 12 states disenfranchise felons after they have completed probation or parole, said Marc Mauer, executive director of the Sentencing Project, a Washington policy organization that advocates restoring felons’ voting rights.

Read full story in The New York Times