After the warning signs were placed, Sheriff Long posted a message on his official Facebook page, along with a picture of the sign. In his post, he explained that the signs had only been placed in front of the homes of registered sex offenders. His message also erroneously represented that Georgia law forbids registered sex offenders from participating in Halloween. In its decision, the Court concluded, “It is now undisputed, however, that Georgia law does not forbid registered sex offenders from participating in Halloween.” See Opinion at 6.

NARSOL was outraged by Sheriff Long’s actions, and we began searching for legal counsel to challenge what we believed to be an unlawful order. We secured the services of Mark Yurachek, an Atlanta based attorney, who had won a challenge to Georgia’s Global Positioning Systems (GPS) monitoring regime. With Mr. Yurachek’s assistance and funding provided by NARSOL, letters were sent to all registrants in Butts County. Mr. Yurachek’s office identified three good plaintiffs who then sued, seeking to enjoin the sheriff from placing the signs again in 2019.

Sheriff Long explained that he believed the signs were “imperative” to warn the public about the residences of registered sex offenders. Prior to 2018, the sheriff’s office had provided registrants with a flier at Halloween and asked them to place it on their doors. He believed that placing a yard sign out by the road would be more effective because it would prevent children from walking to the door. Long has been sheriff in Butts County since 2013, and he admitted that during his tenure, he did not know of any incidents in Butts County involving registrants on Halloween. In fact, during his six-year tenure as sheriff, there were no issues with any registrants in Butts County having unauthorized contact or reoffending with minors at any time.

The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court erred in two ways. First, it determined that a compelled government speech claim requires a finding that a reasonable third party would view the speech as endorsed by the plaintiff. Second, the district court erred by determining that the plaintiffs’ ability to place their own yard signs disagreeing with the warning signs could cure the original violation. The Court stated, “This ignores that the harm here is the forced display of a government message on private property in violation of the right to refrain from speaking at all.” See Opinion at 12-13.

NARSOL is extremely gratified by this decision and believes it validates our mission in challenging law enforcement when they choose to invent requirements that are not part of a statutory scheme. This case took nearly four years to work its way through the trial court and then through the appeals process. We wish to thank the Alliance for Constitutional Sexual Offense Laws (ACSOL) for their help. ACSOL provided an amicus brief which may have been significant in the Court’s final analysis. Sheriff Long vowed at the onset of this case that he would take this all the way to the United States Supreme Court. Butts County officials are now at that point because he has lost yet again. We anticipate that there will be additional challenges to law enforcement agencies who choose to invent and impose their own requirements.

NARSOL wishes to remind Sheriff Long and other law enforcement officials in Georgia that you took an oath to enforce the law. Your office as an elected sheriff does not permit you to make law. If you wish to formulate law, you should consider running for the Georgia General Assembly.

Those points, which should be obvious, are a sadly necessary corrective to the hysteria that has driven legislators in one state after another to enact indiscriminate, mindlessly restrictive, and covertly punitive laws aimed at sex offenders. ASORCNA, which Watkins calls “the most comprehensive and debilitating sex-offender scheme in the nation,” is a prime example.

The lead plaintiff in this case, dubbed John Doe 1, pleaded guilty to two misdemeanor charges of indecent exposure in the early 1990s, when he was living in Wisconsin. He received a six-month suspended sentence for each charge and was not required to register as a sex offender, even after moving to Alabama in 1994. But 14 years later, Alabama expanded its registry, forcing Doe to comply with ASORCNA’s numerous demands and restrictions under threat of imprisonment. Among other things, that meant his driver’s license was marked with the phrase “CRIMINAL SEX OFFENDER” in bold red letters. Here is how Doe describes the consequences of that notation:

I have never felt so embarrassed and ashamed in all of my life. I would not wish showing this on my worst enemy. It makes me not want to go places where I have to show it, and I try not to go places where I know I will have to. But every week, there is some places that ask me to show it, and every time, I get them evil looks from people—like I’m a murderer or something. I done paid for what I did over 25 years ago. Nobody should have to carry this. It ain’t right, but I don’t have a way out.

On Monday, Judge Watkins ruled that Alabama’s branding of registered sex offenders’ identification cards is a form of compelled speech prohibited by the First Amendment. “The branded-ID requirement compels speech,” he writes, “and it is not the least restrictive means of advancing a compelling state interest.” The state conceded that its ostensible purpose of alerting police officers to a sex offender’s status could be served by a much less conspicuous mark, such as a letter, that the general public would not readily recognize as a badge of shame. “Using one letter would keep officers informed while reducing the unnecessary disclosure of information to others,” Watkins notes.

Another aspect of Alabama’s “debilitating sex-offender scheme” is a requirement that people in the registry report “email addresses or instant message addresses or identifiers used, including any designations or monikers used for self-identification in Internet communications or postings other than those used exclusively in connection with a lawful commercial transaction.” Registrants also have to keep the authorities apprised of “any and all Internet service providers” they use. The information, which includes mundane activities such as logging into a Wi-Fi network outside the home or registering with a website to comment on news articles, must be reported within three business days, and local law enforcement agencies have the discretion to demand that it be done in person.

That requirement also violates the First Amendment, Watkins concluded. “An offender must report to the police every time he connects to a Wi-Fi spot at a new McDonald’s, every time he uses a new computer terminal at a public library, every time he borrows a smartphone to read the news online, and every time he anonymously comments on a news article,” he writes. “Every time he walks into a new coffee shop, he must determine whether opening his laptop is worth the hassle of reporting.” Those burdens “chill a wide swath of protected speech under penalty of felony,” Watkins says, making the law “facially overbroad.”

Watkins notes that the demand for information about online activity applied to Doe and the other four plaintiffs even though their offenses had nothing to do with the internet or children. And like other ASORCNA provisions, such as its restrictions on residency and employment, the rule applies for life, even though the risk of recidivism for most offenders declines over time to the point that registrants pose no greater threat than the average person. “The failure to account for risk is a problem throughout ASORCNA,” Watkins observes. “Not all sex crimes are the same. Nor are all offenders the same.”

That’s a striking statement from a judge who was appointed by George W. Bush just two years after the U.S. Supreme Court upheld Alaska’s sex offender registry based partly on fictitious recidivism numbers that continue to influence state and federal courts. It’s a message that judges and legislators throughout the country need to hear.

Source: Reason.com

Let me be as clear as I can to anyone who happens to read this posting. North Carolina’s ban on the use of social media by registered citizens who are not otherwise on post-release supervision or probation is absolutely, unequivocally null and void having been struck down, in its entirety, by the United States Supreme Court in June, 2017 (See Packingham v. North Carolina). Any attempt by a law enforcement agent in the state of North Carolina to enforce this ban against a registered citizen who is no longer under any form of court-ordered supervision will constitute a false arrest. Pure and simple.

The mere fact that the statute remains searchable is irrelevant to questions regarding its legitimacy. There are hundreds of laws on the books that can no longer be enforced. Sheriff Harrison knows that. Most of the sheriffs in the state know that. And if they have any questions about a certain statute’s authority, they should refer such questions to the Attorney General’s office for a legal opinion. What sheriffs and their deputies should NOT do is provide false and unreliable information to the citizens living in their counties.

Will North Carolina’s social media statute be re-written and eventually re-enacted by the state Legislature? It is probable that the state Legislature will attempt to craft a replacement statute. How it can write such a statute narrowly enough to avoid additional constitutional review is yet to be seen. Anything too broadly written would be easily enjoined by a federal District Court. Anything written narrowly enough to pass scrutiny under the Packingham analysis is likely to be a fairly benign and practically useless law. And anything that’s even borderline constitutional will immediately be the subject of a new lawsuit by NCRSOL and our attorneys….and very likely enjoined before it’s ever able to take effect.

If you are a registered citizen living in North Carolina and you are no longer under any form of court-ordered supervision, you have a First Amendment right to access and use social media. There are still social media platforms that have corporate policies restricting your use. But as of June 19, 2017, the state of North Carolina and any derivative law enforcement agency of ANY jurisdiction within the state of North Carolina has absolutely no authority to arrest you for using social media.

However, you are still required to report your online identifiers!  VERY IMPORTANT.

If you are a registered citizen living in North Carolina (and no longer under ANY form of supervision) and have been informed by local law enforcement that you cannot use social media, please contact us immediately. If you or someone you know is threatened with arrest for using social media, please contact us immediately. You can find our contact information at the top of the home page.

“All persons” include people on the registry for sex crimes according to the ruling handed down Monday. Packingham v. North Carolina analyzed the extent to which North Carolina’s draconian measure to prevent anyone on the sex offender registry from using social media was necessary and legitimate. Justice Alito mentioned in his concurring opinion that the statute was so broad that accessing Amazon and Walmart could be construed as a violation. Not only was the law extremely broad, but the facts of the case were ripe for a challenge.

In 2002, at age 21, Lester Packingham engaged in sexual wrongdoing with a minor. He was convicted and served out his sentence. Flash forward eight years to 2010, when Lester logged on to Facebook to jubilantly praise God for a dismissed parking ticket. A North Carolina detective discovered the post and arrested him for violating the state ban on accessing Facebook.

Three facts are important to remember. One, Lester was no longer under community supervision, but he was still listed on the state’s registry for sex crimes. Two, Lester was not arrested for committing another act of sexual wrongdoing, nor was he ever convicted for using the internet to engage in sexual wrongdoing. Three, over 1,000 people have been prosecuted under this law since 2008. These facts implicate the North Carolina statute as more of a tool to restrict First Amendment rights and incarcerate people, with less utility given to preventing sexual abuse.

Please read David’s full commentary on the Sex Law and Policy Center website.

In reversing the N.C. Supreme Court’s decision in Packingham v. North Carolina, the high Court admits wading into uncharted territory by explaining that the case “is one of the first [it] has taken to address the relationship between the First Amendment and the modern Internet,” but was guided to its decision by long held and fundamental approaches to First Amendment jurisprudence.

“While in the past there may have been difficulty in identifying the most important places (in a spatial sense) for the exchange of views, today the answer is clear. It is cyberspace—the ‘vast democratic forums of the Internet’ . . . [and] the Court must exercise extreme caution before suggesting that the First Amendment provides scant protection for access to vast networks in that medium.”

The Court made clear that states remain within the legitimate and permissible contours of First Amendment protections whenever they seek to restrict criminal conduct. “Specific criminal acts are not protected speech even if speech is the means for their commission.” Thus, laws targeting a sex offender (or anyone else) who engages in “conduct that often presages a sexual crime, like contacting a minor or using a website to gather information about a minor” will continue to be constitutionally enforceable.

Stating that North Carolina had not met its burden to demonstrate that a social media ban achieved its legitimate interests in protecting children from predators, the Court held that states “may not enact [a] complete bar to the exercise of First Amendment rights on websites integral to the fabric of our modern society and culture.”

The Court appeared particularly concerned about the application of restrictive laws to citizens who “are no longer subject to the supervision of the criminal justice system” and found it “unsettling to suggest that only a limited set of websites can be used even by persons who have completed their sentences.” The specific question before the Court in Packingham provided no opportunity for the Court to resolve this tension, but it’s a prescient concern that Justice Kennedy was keen to observe which was embraced by at least four additional justices.

NARSOL was joined by its North Carolina affiliate, NCRSOL, and the Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers (ATSA) on an amicus brief filed in support of the petitioner, Lester Packingham.

At 21, Mr. Packingham was convicted of taking indecent liberties with a minor—a non-contact offense in North Carolina. As a result he was placed on North Carolina’s sex offender registry and subjected to the state’s prohibition against having or accessing an account on any online platform that allowed exchange of ideas and on which minors were allowed to create and maintain accounts.

In 2010, Packingham violated this law when he took to Facebook to claim, “God is good,” over having a traffic ticket dismissed. As a result he was arrested and charged, not for what he said but for where he said it. He and his attorneys have fought the charges for the past six years, a fight that culminated in arguments before the U.S. Supreme Court.

At the heart of the argument is the First Amendment right to free speech. Packingham has satisfied all court-imposed requirements and has successfully completed his criminal sentence. He is under no state or federal supervision. He has not re-offended or come under scrutiny for any illegal activity except using Facebook to express his joy about the outcome of a traffic ticket.

The National Association for Rational Sexual Offense Laws (NARSOL) and North Carolina RSOL supported Packingham’s First Amendment claims by way of an amicus brief filed on his behalf. We contend, as do Mr. Packingham and his attorneys, that depriving over 17,000 North Carolina citizens of social media access just because they are on the sex offender registry is an egregious abuse of the state’s power and does virtually nothing to address the state’s compelling interest in protecting minors.

The ban applies to all registrants regardless of whether or not their original offenses involved a minor, whether or not those offenses involved Internet use, or whether the persons were engaging in “stalking” or “grooming” behavior towards a minor. Such a ban makes illegal perfectly innocent and legal activities such as participating in or even following political discussions on Twitter, advertising one’s home business on Facebook, or commenting on a variety of opinion pieces on almost all online media comment platforms.

If the state of North Carolina is convinced that its youth are at risk from citizens on the registry due to contact through online activities, a ban on such activities can surely be tailored more narrowly to address real criminal conduct rather than cutting such a wide swath through the heart of the First Amendment.

…………………………………………………………………………………………………

Here’s how other media outlets are covering oral arguments:
ScotusBlog
U.S. News & World Report
Bloomberg

At the same time, Brian Schnee, a police officer in Durham, was doing his job, working to identify registered sex offenders in the state who were accessing sites like Facebook. He came across Packingham’s post and recognized the face but not the name on the page, “J.r. Gerrard.” Because Schnee knew Packingham to be a sex offender the officer got a search warrant for Packingham’s residence, where he found proof that Packingham was, indeed, “J.r. Gerrard” and that he had, indeed, opened the Facebook account.

Packingham’s glee soon ended. He was indicted and ultimately convicted of violating a state law that makes it a felony for any person on the state’s sex offender registry to “access” any “commercial social networking Website” that he or she “knows” does not restrict membership to adults. The sweeping measure, enacted in 2008, applies to approximately 20,000 North Carolina residents who have been placed on the offender registry for one reason or another. It has been used in more than 1,000 prosecutions like the one against Packingham.

But none of those other cases generated a successful U.S. Supreme Court appeal. For six years now Packingham has fought the charges, in and out of court, on the simple premise that it should not be a crime to express online joy (on Facebook or any other site) about the demise of a parking ticket. And prosecutors and state attorneys have been equally adamant since 2010 that the law that ensnared Packingham is a valid exercise of state power to protect the Internet’s most vulnerable surfers from great harm.

Next week, the justices in Washington will hear oral arguments in the Packingham case. The primary dispute centers around Packingham’s free speech rights: does the First Amendment protect his ability to be on Facebook as a sex offender? But just below the surface is a dispute about how far the state may go to punish someone for acting without criminal intent. As Packingham’s lawyers put it: “[E]arly First Amendment cases establish basic principles restricting criminal punishment to persons proved to have acted with both ‘an evil doing hand’ and ‘an evil meaning mind’” and Packingham is guilty of neither.

(Please continue reading at The Marshall Project)

Emboldened by a recent decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals that set aside similar amendments and enhancements imposed by the state of Michigan, NARSOL and NCRSOL are joined by individual plaintiffs who seek to set aside legislative enactments since 2006 that have incrementally expanded the scope of restrictions imposed upon citizens required to register as sex offenders.

For more than a decade, the North Carolina Legislature has continued to add increasingly burdensome restrictions on its registrant population as evidenced by its recent passage of a revised premises statute (§ 14-208.18) even despite significant push back from the federal courts.

Such restrictions include prohibitions on where registrants may live and work, go to school, dine, recreate, attend sporting events, or even worship. Registered sex offenders are forbidden to change their names, access a wide variety of social media websites, and are generally restricted from being within 300 feet of any location where children frequently congregate including libraries, shopping malls, and many restaurants.

“The time has come to confront these laws more aggressively. They simply do not protect the public. The research is clear that laws such as North Carolina’s actually increase the danger to the public by preventing people from effectively reintegrating into society. At the same time, too many people are being denied basic constitutional rights under the guise of public safety. Nobody disputes the state’s compelling interest in protecting children and adults from sexual abuse. But no American citizen should have to give up fundamental, guaranteed, First Amendment freedoms in the name of a policy that simply doesn’t work,” said Robin Vanderwall, president of NCRSOL.

Paul Dubbeling, a Chapel Hill attorney who was successful in a previous challenge to the state’s defunct premises statute, filed the new complaint in federal district court on Monday. When asked about this new suit, Dubbeling stated: “This is ultimately about public safety. The North Carolina registry law simply fails to actually protect the public while at the same time unnecessarily denying basic constitutional rights to tens of thousands of citizens. To protect both the public and the Constitution, we need to return the power to decide who is dangerous and who isn’t to those best able to judge – the judges themselves.”

[Alert Conspiracy readers will recall that the Supreme Court has agreed to review a decision by the North Carolina Supreme Court that rejected a First Amendment challenge to a different section of the N.C. sex offender regulatory scheme — one that imposes criminal penalties on sex offenders who “access … commercial social networking websites” for any reason. Eugene and I have blogged extensively about this case: See here, here, here, and here].

In this case, the statute in question made it a Class H felony (punishable by “a presumptive term of imprisonment of 20 months) for sex offenders to “knowingly be” at any of the following locations:

(1) On the premises of any place intended primarily for the use, care, or supervision of minors, including, but not limited to, schools, children’s museums, child care centers, nurseries, and playgrounds.
(2) Within 300 feet of any location intended primarily for the use, care, or supervision of minors when the place is located on premises that are not intended primarily for the use, care, or supervision of minors, including, but not limited to, places described in subdivision (1) . . . that are located in malls, shopping centers, or other property open to the general public. [Or]
(3) At any place where minors gather for regularly scheduled educational, recreational, or social programs. NCGS 14-208.18(a).

The court held, first, that the provisions of subsection (3) are unconstitutionally vague; “neither an ordinary citizen nor a law enforcement officer could reasonably determine what activity was criminalized by subsection (a)(3).”

Two principal problems are evident in subsection (a)(3) which compel the conclusion it is unconstitutionally vague. In particular, a reasonable person, whether a restricted sex offender or a law enforcement officer, cannot reasonably determine (1) whether a program for minors is “regularly scheduled” or (2) what places qualify as those “where minors gather.” …

The term “regular” means happening at fixed intervals. Even if a restricted sex offender or law enforcement officer knew precisely how often and where the “scheduled programs” took place, the statute provides no principled standard at all for determining whether such programs are “regularly scheduled.” Notably, subsection (a)(3) provides no examples to guide restricted sex offenders or law enforcement as to how frequently the programs would need to occur in order to be “regularly scheduled.” …

Subsection (a)(3)’s “where minors gather” language is also without defining standards. For example, subsection (a)(3) does not explain how many minors must gather at the place. Subsection (a)(3) also does not explain whether a place where mixed groups of minors and adults gather, such as a community college that has some high school students or a church with a congregation of adults and minors, would be considered a restricted zone under subsection (a)(3).

Additionally, the court found that subsection (a)(2) could not withstand “intermediate scrutiny” under the First Amendment:

To pass intermediate scrutiny, a statute must materially advance[] an important or substantial [government] interest by redressing past harms or preventing future ones. In addition, it must have the right “fit.” That is, it cannot burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests.

The burden of establishing the required fit is placed “squarely upon the government,” and North Carolina failed to meet it — by a goodly distance, failing to present any evidence whatsoever that the statute advanced the state’s interest in protecting minors in any way. At trial, the district court “put the State on notice that its limited evidence was inadequate to meet its burden of proof, but the State “explicitly declined to introduce any additional evidence.”

[The State’s] decision to not provide expert testimony or statistical reports to the Court was somewhat unexpected. … The State tries to overcome its lack of data, social science or scientific research, legislative findings, or other empirical evidence with an appeal to “logic and common sense.” But neither anecdote, common sense, nor logic, in a vacuum, is sufficient to carry the State’s burden of proof.

[T]he State cannot rest its case on the conclusory assertion that minors would be “more exposed to harm without [this] prohibition than with it.” Without empirical data or other similar credible evidence, it is not possible to tell whether subsection (a)(2) — and specifically its application to offenders with only adult victims — responds at all to the State’s legitimate interest in protecting minors from sexual assault.”

That might seem an unspectacular point; if the State offers no evidence at all that the statutory prohibition does anything to ameliorate the evils at which it is aimed, it cannot possibly satisfy the State’s burden of demonstrating that the statute “materially advances” the State’s interest. It is noteworthy, however, because so many other courts have meekly accepted the “conclusory assertion,” based on “common sense,” that the statute does more good than harm, and does not burden more speech than necessary to accomplish that good. [In the other North Carolina case referred to above, for example, the state presented no evidence that the ban on accessing social networking sites was, in fact, effective in any way at protecting minors — but the North Carolina Supreme Court upheld it anyway].

So kudos to Judges Motz, Traxler and Agee. This is just what the federal courts are supposed to do when constitutional rights are at stake: hold the government’s feet to the fire, and demand that they demonstrate that have a damned good reason for doing what they’re doing.

(Source:The Volokh Conspiracy of The Washington Post.)

Our Opinion: Sex offenders’ social media ban needs a rewrite

Not all sex offenders are created equal.

A well-intentioned but overreaching state law barring registered sex offenders from using Facebook, Twitter and other forms of social media — whether or not their crimes involved either children or the internet — is headed for the U.S. Supreme Court.

Durham resident Lester Gerard Packingham appealed his 2012 conviction of maintaining a social media profile as a sex offender, arguing that the state law is unconstitutional. The N.C. Court of Appeals agreed with Packingham in August 2013, but the state Supreme Court upheld the statute last year in a 4-2 ruling.

The federal high court agreed last month to let Packingham plead his case that the law violates the First Amendment by squelching ex-convicts’ online speech.

Under N.C. General Statute 14-202.5, sex offenders are prohibited from accessing commercial social networking websites that extend membership to minors. That sounds reasonable and necessary for pedophiles, but it’s a head-scratcher for offenders who have groped or sexually assaulted other adults.

Writing for a unanimous three-judge panel, Court of Appeals Judge Rick Elmore wrote in 2013 that the vague law “fails to target the ‘evil’ it is intended to rectify” — namely, child sexual predators trolling the internet for their next victim.

The state Supreme Court reversed the appellate panel, finding that the law regulated conduct rather than speech and that its definition of verboten websites left offenders with “ample alternative channels for communication.” Justices even provided examples, including recipe-sharing sites, job boards and a television news station’s website.

There’s likely to be a lot of legal hairsplitting over the state court’s “ample alternative channels” language, which is also the focal point of a friend-of-the-court brief filed by First Amendment scholar Eugene Volokh.

Rather than getting into the weeds of that technical argument, we’ll appeal instead to common sense. What good does it do to arbitrarily ban all sex offenders from Facebook when most of those convicts have no interest in scoping out young users?

Registered sex offenders are about as reviled as any category of criminal. But the same label applied to rapists and child molesters is also used to tag teenagers who share racy photos or are punished for sexual relationships with slightly younger classmates.

Not only is North Carolina able to distinguish the former from the latter, it already does. The state applies the term “sexually violent predator” to those convicted of certain crimes and “recidivist” to those who reoffend. Those designations are included on the publicly searchable sex offender registry.

Instead of wasting taxpayer money to defend a carelessly crafted law in the nation’s highest court, why not revise the statute to exclude only child sexual predators from social networking sites?

Lawmakers have two choices: Stand behind sloppy work and risk a ruling that could open the floodgates to all sex offenders or fix their mistake and protect children by shutting out those who pose a genuine danger.  (Source)