In reversing the N.C. Supreme Court’s decision in Packingham v. North Carolina, the high Court admits wading into uncharted territory by explaining that the case “is one of the first [it] has taken to address the relationship between the First Amendment and the modern Internet,” but was guided to its decision by long held and fundamental approaches to First Amendment jurisprudence.

“While in the past there may have been difficulty in identifying the most important places (in a spatial sense) for the exchange of views, today the answer is clear. It is cyberspace—the ‘vast democratic forums of the Internet’ . . . [and] the Court must exercise extreme caution before suggesting that the First Amendment provides scant protection for access to vast networks in that medium.”

The Court made clear that states remain within the legitimate and permissible contours of First Amendment protections whenever they seek to restrict criminal conduct. “Specific criminal acts are not protected speech even if speech is the means for their commission.” Thus, laws targeting a sex offender (or anyone else) who engages in “conduct that often presages a sexual crime, like contacting a minor or using a website to gather information about a minor” will continue to be constitutionally enforceable.

Stating that North Carolina had not met its burden to demonstrate that a social media ban achieved its legitimate interests in protecting children from predators, the Court held that states “may not enact [a] complete bar to the exercise of First Amendment rights on websites integral to the fabric of our modern society and culture.”

The Court appeared particularly concerned about the application of restrictive laws to citizens who “are no longer subject to the supervision of the criminal justice system” and found it “unsettling to suggest that only a limited set of websites can be used even by persons who have completed their sentences.” The specific question before the Court in Packingham provided no opportunity for the Court to resolve this tension, but it’s a prescient concern that Justice Kennedy was keen to observe which was embraced by at least four additional justices.

NARSOL was joined by its North Carolina affiliate, NCRSOL, and the Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers (ATSA) on an amicus brief filed in support of the petitioner, Lester Packingham.

At the same time, Brian Schnee, a police officer in Durham, was doing his job, working to identify registered sex offenders in the state who were accessing sites like Facebook. He came across Packingham’s post and recognized the face but not the name on the page, “J.r. Gerrard.” Because Schnee knew Packingham to be a sex offender the officer got a search warrant for Packingham’s residence, where he found proof that Packingham was, indeed, “J.r. Gerrard” and that he had, indeed, opened the Facebook account.

Packingham’s glee soon ended. He was indicted and ultimately convicted of violating a state law that makes it a felony for any person on the state’s sex offender registry to “access” any “commercial social networking Website” that he or she “knows” does not restrict membership to adults. The sweeping measure, enacted in 2008, applies to approximately 20,000 North Carolina residents who have been placed on the offender registry for one reason or another. It has been used in more than 1,000 prosecutions like the one against Packingham.

But none of those other cases generated a successful U.S. Supreme Court appeal. For six years now Packingham has fought the charges, in and out of court, on the simple premise that it should not be a crime to express online joy (on Facebook or any other site) about the demise of a parking ticket. And prosecutors and state attorneys have been equally adamant since 2010 that the law that ensnared Packingham is a valid exercise of state power to protect the Internet’s most vulnerable surfers from great harm.

Next week, the justices in Washington will hear oral arguments in the Packingham case. The primary dispute centers around Packingham’s free speech rights: does the First Amendment protect his ability to be on Facebook as a sex offender? But just below the surface is a dispute about how far the state may go to punish someone for acting without criminal intent. As Packingham’s lawyers put it: “[E]arly First Amendment cases establish basic principles restricting criminal punishment to persons proved to have acted with both ‘an evil doing hand’ and ‘an evil meaning mind’” and Packingham is guilty of neither.

(Please continue reading at The Marshall Project)