The state’s highest court next month takes up the case of repeat sex offender Torrey Grady. It comes three years after the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in his case that mandating GPS ankle monitors for ex-cons is a serious privacy concern.

“There’s different possible outcomes of the case. One is that it’s never reasonable at all. Another is that it’s reasonable, maybe while the person is still on post-release supervision” for five years after prison release, said James Markham, a professor who focuses on criminal law at the University of North Carolina’s School of Government. “Another possibility is that it’s reasonable for the rest of their life.”

Grady took his case to the nation’s top court arguing that having his movements forever monitored violated his constitutional protection against unreasonable searches. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that attaching a device to a person’s body in order to track their movements qualifies as a “search” and a question of constitutional rights. But the decision left it up to states to decide whether imposed monitoring is reasonable, and for how long.

States are still at work answering that question, with Michigan and Wisconsin among the handful that have considered whether long-term electronic monitoring’s public benefit outweighs the privacy rights of the sex offender. Both decided it constituted a reasonable search. Delaware’s Supreme Court last year rejected a challenge from the American Civil Liberties Union to a law requiring GPS monitoring of certain sex offenders complained the ankle bracelets were embarrassing, sometimes painful and an invasion of privacy.

North Carolina’s Supreme Court will consider Grady’s case on Dec. 3 as well as a second challenging the GPS tracking ordered for Darren Gentle. The combination would give the justices “an opportunity to compare and contrast those different situations,” Markham said.

Gentile was convicted in Randolph County in 2016 of violently raping a 25-year-old woman who was seven months pregnant and with whom he’d been taking drugs, according to state attorneys. He is serving a 41-year prison sentence, but is arguing he shouldn’t have been ordered into post-release GPS monitoring because the trial judge didn’t review whether that was reasonable.

Grady, 40, returned to prison in April after failing to register as a sex offender, according to state prison records. He was convicted of a sexual offense in 1997 when he was 17, and was convicted in 2007 of taking indecent liberties with a minor who was 15, according to the state sex offender registry.

His attorneys argue that after paying his debt to society in prison, Grady and other sex offenders do not give up their privacy rights even though laws restrict where they can live and travel, for example barring visits to school grounds.

A divided panel of North Carolina’s second-highest court in May reversed a trial judge that ordered Grady enrolled for life in satellite-based monitoring, saying they saw no studies showing tracking prevented future crimes.

“The State failed to present any evidence of its need to monitor defendant, or the procedures actually used to conduct such monitoring in unsupervised cases. Therefore, the State failed to prove” that lifetime monitoring, the state Court of Appeals ruled, “is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.”

Reprinted from the Charlotte Observer.

Our Opinion: Sex offenders’ social media ban needs a rewrite

Not all sex offenders are created equal.

A well-intentioned but overreaching state law barring registered sex offenders from using Facebook, Twitter and other forms of social media — whether or not their crimes involved either children or the internet — is headed for the U.S. Supreme Court.

Durham resident Lester Gerard Packingham appealed his 2012 conviction of maintaining a social media profile as a sex offender, arguing that the state law is unconstitutional. The N.C. Court of Appeals agreed with Packingham in August 2013, but the state Supreme Court upheld the statute last year in a 4-2 ruling.

The federal high court agreed last month to let Packingham plead his case that the law violates the First Amendment by squelching ex-convicts’ online speech.

Under N.C. General Statute 14-202.5, sex offenders are prohibited from accessing commercial social networking websites that extend membership to minors. That sounds reasonable and necessary for pedophiles, but it’s a head-scratcher for offenders who have groped or sexually assaulted other adults.

Writing for a unanimous three-judge panel, Court of Appeals Judge Rick Elmore wrote in 2013 that the vague law “fails to target the ‘evil’ it is intended to rectify” — namely, child sexual predators trolling the internet for their next victim.

The state Supreme Court reversed the appellate panel, finding that the law regulated conduct rather than speech and that its definition of verboten websites left offenders with “ample alternative channels for communication.” Justices even provided examples, including recipe-sharing sites, job boards and a television news station’s website.

There’s likely to be a lot of legal hairsplitting over the state court’s “ample alternative channels” language, which is also the focal point of a friend-of-the-court brief filed by First Amendment scholar Eugene Volokh.

Rather than getting into the weeds of that technical argument, we’ll appeal instead to common sense. What good does it do to arbitrarily ban all sex offenders from Facebook when most of those convicts have no interest in scoping out young users?

Registered sex offenders are about as reviled as any category of criminal. But the same label applied to rapists and child molesters is also used to tag teenagers who share racy photos or are punished for sexual relationships with slightly younger classmates.

Not only is North Carolina able to distinguish the former from the latter, it already does. The state applies the term “sexually violent predator” to those convicted of certain crimes and “recidivist” to those who reoffend. Those designations are included on the publicly searchable sex offender registry.

Instead of wasting taxpayer money to defend a carelessly crafted law in the nation’s highest court, why not revise the statute to exclude only child sexual predators from social networking sites?

Lawmakers have two choices: Stand behind sloppy work and risk a ruling that could open the floodgates to all sex offenders or fix their mistake and protect children by shutting out those who pose a genuine danger.  (Source)

Writing for the majority, Justice Robert H. “Bob” Edmunds reasoned that since the statute under review in Packingham concerned only conduct, and not speech, the impact to registered citizens’ First Amendment rights was merely incidental to the otherwise legitimate interest of the state in prohibiting such conduct. He further reasoned that there were already “ample alternative means” through which registered citizens could participate in expressive forums open and available to them. His reasoning was strained and tortured and his opinion was summarily dismembered by the dissent penned by Justice Robin E. Hudson.

For additional information and analyses of what’s at stake for the community of registered citizens throughout the entire nation, please read Eugene Volokh’s piece in the Washington Post. Prof. Volokh teaches free speech law, religious freedom law, church-state relations law, a First Amendment Amicus Brief Clinic, and tort law, at UCLA School of Law and filed an Amicus Brief in support of the petition for Certiorari in the Packingham case.

After the chief justice extended the time for filing, Atty. Glenn Gerding, counsel for the petitioner, Lester Gerard Packingham, filed a Petition for Certiorari from the North Carolina Supreme Court on March 21, 2016.

Mr. Packingham is a North Carolina registrant who was convicted by a jury in 2011 for accessing Facebook, a commercial networking website which permits minors as registered users. This was a violation of N.C.G.S. § 14-202.5. Before trial, Packingham sought to have the charges dismissed on grounds that the statute violated his First Amendment rights. In ruling on the motion, the trial judge found the statute to be constitutional as applied to the defendant and declined to address the defendant’s facial challenge for want of jurisdiction. Packingham was sentenced to 6 to 8 months in prison, fully suspended, pursuant to the completion of 12 months of supervised probation. Packingham appealed.

In August, 2013, a three-judge panel of the North Carolina Court of Appeals vacated the lower court’s ruling and concluded that N.C.G.S. § 14- 202.5 was not narrowly tailored, vague, and failed to “target the ‘evil’ it is intended to rectify.” The Court of Appeals also held that the statute violated “the First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech, and [was] unconstitutional on its face and as applied.”

In turn, the NC Attorney General’s office appealed the Court of Appeals’ decision to the North Carolina Supreme Court which, on November 6, 2015, by a 4 to 2 decision, reversed the Court of Appeals’ Order to Vacate and re-instated Mr. Packigham’s conviction. The state supreme court held the statute to be constitutional in all respects since it proscribes only conduct (access to a social networking site) rather than speech and that the impact on an individual registrant’s speech was merely incidental to this prohibition on conduct.

While the Writ for Certiorari has not yet been granted, the United States Supreme Court appears interested enough in hearing the state’s response, which it formally requested on April 28, 2016. The state has until May 31 to respond so it’s impossible to know at this time either how the state will respond or when the Court might reschedule the Petition for conference.

Packingham’s petition summarizes that the chief question before the Court is “whether, under this Court’s First Amendment precedents, a law that makes it a felony for any person on the state’s registry of former sex offenders to ‘access’ a wide array of websites – including Facebook, YouTube, and nytimes.com – that enable communication, expression, and the exchange of information among their users, if the site is ‘know[n]’ to allow minors to have accounts, is permissible, both on its face and as applied to petitioner – who was convicted based on a Facebook ‘post’ in which he celebrated dismissal of a traffic ticket, declaring ‘God is Good!’”

The Petition for Writ surmises that this case requires the Supreme Court’s intervention because 1) the NC Supreme Court’s decision contravenes “first principles” of basic constitutional law because of the ruling’s unconventional application of “conduct regulation” and “heightened scrutiny” analyses, and 2) that the decision is in conflict with numerous lower court opinions.

Just a week before the U.S. Supreme Court requested a response from North Carolina, a group of 16 law professors led by Eugene Volokh filed an Amici Curiae on behalf of the petitioner focusing exclusively on the NC Supreme Court’s tortured application of an “ample alternative channels” standard to the statute at issue.

Retired professor of law, David Post, recently explained the rationale behind the professors’ brief in a post for The Volokh Conspiracy blog of the Washington Post. Professor Post argues that the NC Supreme Court’s analysis is absurd because it rests upon the incredulous proposition that websites such as the Pauline Dean network, wral.com, glassdoor.com, or shutterfly are comparable to social networking giants such as Facebook, Twitter, or LinkedIn, and that prohibiting registrants from accessing such sites is no impediment to their First Amendment rights because such “ample alternatives” exist. Professor Post cites to his colleague’s previous explication of the Amicus brief here.

It is, of course, impossible to know whether the U.S. Supreme Court will grant the Writ. It grants very few. In any given year, the Court entertains nearly 8,000 petitions and grants certiorari in less than one percent (about 80). But the fact that the Packingham case was originally scheduled for conference on May 12 and then removed from the calendar consequent to the Amicus filing, quickly followed by the Court’s official request for a response from the state of North Carolina, at the very least provides surety that the Court is paying significant attention to the important constitutional questions underlying this Petition.

North Carolina bans registered sex offenders from using or accessing any social networking website that allows under-18-year-olds to post. This includes, of course, the vast bulk of the social networking universe – Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, LinkedIn, Reddit, along with many, many other such sites. The ban is not limited to people who are in prison or on probation or parole (whose First Amendment rights are sharply reduced because of that); it applies even to people who have finished serving their sentences, and who possess, at least in principle, the same First Amendment rights as you and I. Nor is the law limited to sex offenders who had committed crimes against minors (though I think that too would be unconstitutional). Rather, the law makes it a crime for any registered sex offender to either post to such a site or even read it, on the theory that the law is needed “to prevent registered sex offenders from prowling on social media and gathering information about potential child targets.”

There are, as Volokh succinctly put it in the earlier posting, “many First Amendment problems” with the N.C. court’s decision rejecting a challenge to the constitutionality of this prohibition.[**] The amicus brief, though, focused on only one of them: the court’s holding that the prohibition is a “reasonable” restriction on speech because it leaves “ample alternative channels” for the speech of persons covered by the ban. Maybe you can’t post (or even access any posts) on Facebook or Twitter or Instagram or Reddit [or NYTimes.com or the Volokh Conspiracy, for that matter, all of whom allow persons under the age of 18 to post/access) … but “the Web offers numerous alternatives that provide the same or similar services that defendant could access without violating” the statute.

It seems crazy to me — imagine trying to run for public office, or participate in someone else’s campaign for public office, or complain to your City Councilperson, or start a petition drive to get a new streetlight on your corner … without being able to access any of the major social networking sites. Not impossible, sure — but it seems quite far-fetched to suggest that there are “ample alternatives” out there on the Web for you to accomplish these tasks.

Fortunately, we have Supreme Court precedent on our side: City of Ladue v. Gilleo (1994), which invalidated a city ordinance banning homeowners from displaying signs on their property. The city argued that the ordinance left people “free to convey their desired messages by other means, such as hand-held signs, ‘letters, handbills, flyers, telephone calls, newspaper advertisements, bumper stickers, speeches, and neighborhood or community meetings.’” But these alternatives, the court held, were inadequate because they tended to convey a substantively different message, were not as cost-effective or failed to reach the speaker’s intended audience. (Please read David’s full post at Volokh Conspiracy of the Washington Post)